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ABSTRACT
Skeleton-based action recognition has attracted increasing atten-
tion due to its strong adaptability to dynamic circumstances and
potential for broad applications such as autonomous and anony-
mous surveillance. With the help of deep learning techniques, it has
also witnessed substantial progress and currently achieved around
90% accuracy in benign environment. On the other hand, research
on the vulnerability of skeleton-based action recognition under dif-
ferent adversarial settings remains scant, which may raise security
concerns about deploying such techniques into real-world systems.
However, filling this research gap is challenging due to the unique
physical constraints of skeletons and human actions. In this paper,
we attempt to conduct a thorough study towards understanding
the adversarial vulnerability of skeleton-based action recognition.
We first formulate generation of adversarial skeleton actions as a
constrained optimization problem by representing or approximat-
ing the physiological and physical constraints with mathematical
formulations. Since the primal optimization problem with equality
constraints is intractable, we propose to solve it by optimizing its
unconstrained dual problem using ADMM. We then specify an ef-
ficient plug-in defense, inspired by recent theories and empirical
observations, against the adversarial skeleton actions. Extensive
evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack and defense
method under different settings.
1 INTRODUCTION
Action recognition is an important task in computer vision, mo-
tivated by many downstream applications such as video surveil-
lance and indexing, and human-machine interaction [6]. It is also a
very challenging task since it requires to capture long-term spatial-
temporal context and understand the semantics of actions. One
method proposed by the community is to learn action recognition
on the human skeleton information collected by cameras or sen-
sors, where an action is represented by a time series of human
joint locations. Compared with video streams, skeleton representa-
tion is more robust to the variance of background conditions, and
also easier-to-handle for machine learning models due to its com-
pact representation. Recent advances in deep learning techniques
boost the performance of this method. Currently, a variety of deep
learning model structures have been applied to skeleton-based ac-
tion recognition, including convolutional neural networks [15, 20],
recurrent neural networks [21, 30], and graph neural networks
[23, 29, 37]. On the other hand, existing work has demonstrated the
vulnerability of deep learning techniques to adversarial examples in
many application domains. This phenomenon gives us a good rea-
son to suspect that the DNNs for skeleton-based action recognition
might also be vulnerable to adversarial skeleton examples despite
achieving high accuracy in a benign environment. Note that a thor-
ough study on the adversarial vulnerability of action-recognition
Figure 1: The targeted Setting: misleading the model to rec-
ognize “kicking people" as “drinking water" (normal action)
by perturbing the skeleton action. To launch the attack in
a real-world scenario (e.g., under a surveillance camera),
the adversarial skeleton action should satisfy certain con-
straints. The figure is drawn based on [28].
models is indispensable before deploying them to real-world appli-
cations such as surveillance systems because otherwise, the poten-
tial adversaries might easily deceive those systems by generating
and imitating specific adversarial actions. However, the study on
the adversarial skeleton examples is scant and non-trivial∗, due to
the fundamental differences between the properties of adversarial
skeleton actions and other adversarial examples. The differences
are mainly caused by the bones between joints and the joint an-
gles, which impose unique spatial constraints on skeleton data [28].
Specifically, in the generated adversarial skeleton actions, lengths
of the bones must be maintained the same, and joint angles can not
violate certain physiological structures. Otherwise, the adversarial
actions are not reproducible by the individuals who perform the
original actions. Also, considering the physical conditions of human
beings, the speeds of motions in the adversarial actions should also
be constrained.
To address the above issues, in this paper, we propose an opti-
mization based method for generating adversarial skeleton actions.
Specifically, we formulate the generation of adversarial skeleton ac-
tions as a constrained optimization problem by representing those
constraints with mathematical equations. Since the primal con-
strained problem is intractable, we turn to solve its dual problem.
Moreover, since all the constraints are represented by mathemati-
cal equations, both primal and dual variables are nonrestrictive in
the dual problem. We further specify an efficient algorithm based
on ADMM to solve the unconstrained dual problem, in which the
internal minimization objective is optimized by an Adam optimizer,
and the external maximization objective is optimized by one-step
gradient ascent. We show that this algorithm can find an adversarial
skeleton action within 200 internal steps.
Other than the attack, we further propose an efficient defense
against adversarial skeleton actions based on previous theories and
empirical observations. Our defense consists of two core steps, i.e.,
∗The only parallel work is detailed in section 2.3.
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adding Gaussian noise and Gaussian filtering to action data. The
first step, adding Gaussian noise, is inspired by the recent advance
in certified defenses. Specifically, adding Gaussian noise to the input
is proved to be a certified defense, which means additive Gauss-
ian noise on the adversarial examples can guarantee the model to
output a correct prediction (with high probability), as long as the
adversarial perturbation is restricted within a certain radius in the
neighbor of the original data sample. Note that there are also several
other methods to certify model robustness, such as dual approach,
interval analysis and abstract interpretations [8, 12, 26, 33, 35]. We
adopt the Gaussian noise method because it is simple, effective,
and more importantly, scalable to complicated models. Note that
skeleton-based action recognition models are always more compli-
cated than the common ConvNets certified by [8, 12, 26, 33, 35]. The
second step is to smooth the skeleton frames along the temporal
axis using a Gaussian filter. This step will not affect the robustness
certified by the first step according to the post-processing property
[7, 18, 20], but can always filter out a certain amount of adversarial
perturbation and random noise in practice, thus making our defense
applicable to normally trained models.
Our proposed attack and defense are evaluated on two open-
source models, i.e., 2s-AGCN and HCN †. Extensive evaluations
show that our attack can achieve 100% attack success rate with
almost no violation of the constraints. Moreover, the visualiza-
tion results, including images and videos, demonstrate that the
difference between the original and adversarial skeleton actions is
imperceptible. Extensive evaluations also show that our defense
is effective and efficient. Specifically, our defense can improve the
empirical accuracy of normally trained models to over 60% against
adversarial skeleton actions under different settings.
To summarize, our main contribution is four-fold:
(1) We identify the constraints needed to be considered in ad-
versarial skeleton actions, and formulate the problem of
generating adversarial skeleton actions as a constrained opti-
mization problem by representing those constraints as math-
ematical equations.
(2) We propose to solve the primal constrained problem by opti-
mizing the dual problem using ADMM, which is the first trial
on generating adversarial actions with ADMM and yields
outstanding performance.
(3) We propose an efficient two-step plug-in defense against
adversarial skeleton actions, and specify the defense in both
inference and certification stages.
(4) We conduct extensive evaluations, and provide several inter-
esting observations regarding adversarial skeleton actions
based on the experimental results.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Definitions and Notations
Let x and l ∈ {1, 2, ...,L} respectively denote a data sample and
the label, where L is the number of all possible classes. For an im-
age, x is a 2D matrix. For a skeleton action studied in this paper,
x ≜ {(xτi ,yτi , zτi )Ii=1}Tτ=1, where (xτi ,yτi , zτi ) denotes the position
†We select these two models because the authors have released the code and hyperpa-
rameters on Github so that we can correctly reproduce the results. Also, these two
models achieve fairly good performance.
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Figure 2: Skeleton Representation
(coordinates) of the i-th joint of the τ -th skeleton frame in an ac-
tion sequence, with I and T denoting the number of joints in a
skeleton and the number of skeleton frames in an action sequence,
respectively. The corresponding adversarial skeleton action is de-
noted by x′ ≜ {(x ′τi ,y′τi , z′τi )Ii=1}Tτ=1. We take the skeletons in
the largest dataset, i.e., NTU RGB+D dataset, as an example. As
shown in figure 2, in a skeleton, there are totally 25 joints in a
skeleton frame, and thus I = 25. The number of frames T differs
for each skeleton action, and usually, we subsample a constant
number of frames from each sequence or pad zeros after each se-
quence to endow all the skeleton actions with the same T . Let
FΘ (·) denote a classification network, whereΘ represents the net-
work weights. The logit output on x is denoted by FΘ (x) with L
elements ({FΘ,k (x) | k = 1, ...,L}). FΘ (·) can correctly classify x
iff argmaxk FΘ,k (x) = l . The goal of adversarial attacks is to find
an adversarial sample x′, which satisfies several pre-defined con-
straints, such that argmaxk FΘ,k (x′) , l or argmaxk FΘ,k (x) = lt
(lt is the target label). A commonly-used constraint is that x′ should
be close to the original sample x according to some distance metric.
2.2 DNNs for Skeleton-based Action
Recognition
In the following, we briefly introduce the two DNNs used for eval-
uation of our proposed attack method in this project. HCN is a
CNN-based end-to-end hierarchical network for learning global
co-occurrence features from skeleton data [20]. HCN is designed
to learn different levels of features from both raw skeleton and
skeleton motion. The joint-level features are learned by a multi-
layer CNN, and the global co-occurrence features are learned from
the fused joint-level features. At the end, the co-occurrence fea-
tures are also fed to a fully-connected network for action classifica-
tion. 2s-AGCN is one of the state-of-the-art GCN-based models for
skeleton-based action recognition. In contrast to the earliest GCN-
based model, (i.e., ST-GCN), 2s-AGCN learns the appropriate graph
topology of every skeleton action rather than prefine the graph
topology. This enables 2s-AGCN to capture the implicit connections
between joints in certain actions, such as the connection between
hand and face in the “wiping face" action. Besides, 2s-AGCN also
adopts the two-stream framework to learn from both static and
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motion information. Overall, 2s-AGCN significantly improves the
accuracy of ST-GCN by nearly 7%.
2.3 Adversarial Attacks
After the discovery of adversarial examples, the community has
developed hundreds of attack methods to generate adversarial sam-
ples. In the following, we mainly introduce four attack methods
plus a parallel work, with a discussion on the difference between
our proposed method and these attacks.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM is a typical one-step
adversarial attack algorithm proposed by [10]. The algorithm up-
dates a benign sample along the direction of the gradient of the
loss w.r.t. the sample. Formally, FGSM follows the update rule as
x′ = clip[vmin,vmax ]{x+ϵ · sign(∇xL(Θ, x, l))} , (1)
where ϵ controls the maximum ℓ∞ perturbation of the adversarial
samples; [vmin ,vmax ] is the valid element-wise value range and
clip[a,b](·) function clips its input into the range of [a,b].
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). PGD [16, 24] is a strong iter-
ative version of FGSM, which executes Eq. 2.3 for multiple steps
with a smaller step size and then projects the updated adversarial
examples into the pre-defined ℓp -norm ball. Specifically, in each
step, PGD updates the sample by
x′t+1 = Proj{x′t +α · sign(∇x′tL(Θ, x′t , l)} (2)
The Proj function is a clip function for ℓ∞-norm balls, and an ℓ2
normalizer for ℓ∞-norm balls.
Carlini and Wagner Attack. [5] proposes an attack called C&W
attack, which generates ℓp -norm adversarial samples by optimiza-
tion over the C&W loss:
min
x′
D(x, x′) + c · loss(x′) . (3)
In the C&W loss, D(x, x′) represents some distance metric between
the benign sample x and the adversarial sample x′, and the metrics
used in [5] include ℓ∞, ℓ0, and ℓ2 distances. loss(·) is a customized
loss. It is worth noting that our proposed attack is completely
different from PGD or C&W attack. For PGD, C&W, or many other
attacks, the simple constraints on the pixel value can be resolved by
projection functions or naturally incorporated into the objective by
siдmoid/tanh function. However, in our scenario, the constrained
optimization problem is much more complicated, and thus has to
be solved by more advanced methods.
ADMM-based Adversarial Attack. [40] also proposes a framework
based on ADMM to generate ℓp adversarial examples. However,
we note that our proposed attack is also completely different from
[40] in two aspects: First, the constraints we consider are more
complicated than the ℓp -norm constraints, which makes ADMM
more appropriate than the other attack algorithms here. Second, we
formulate the problem in a completely different manner from [40].
[40] follows the ADMM framework to break the problem defined
like Eq. 3 into two sub-problems, while our attack formulates a com-
pletely different problem with indispensable equality constraints,
and ADMM is naturally an appropriate solution to this problem.
Adversarial Attack on Skeleton Action. Note that [22] is a parallel
work that proposes an attack based on FGSM and BIM (PGD) to
generate adversarial skeleton actions. Specifically, [22] adapts the
FGSM and BIM to skeleton-based action recognition by using a clip-
ping function and an alignment operation to impose the bone and
joint constraints on the updated adversarial skeleton actions in each
iteration. However, the method is very different from our work. First,
the joint constraint considered in [22] is not the constraint for joint
angles mentioned before. Second, the alignment operation might
corrupt the perturbation learned in each iteration. In contrast to
[22], we attempt to formulate adversarial skeleton action generation
as a constrained optimization problem with equality constraints.
Reformulating the equality constraints by Lagrangian multipliers
yields an unconstrained dual optimization problem, which does
not need any complicated additional operation in the optimization
process. Third, we propose to solve the the dual optimization prob-
lem by ADMM, which is a more appropriate algorithm to optimize
complicated constrained problems. Therefore, the attack achieves
better performance than [22], which will be detailed in section 6.1.
Finally, we specify a defense method against adversarial skeleton
actions based on the state-of-the-art theories and our observations.
2.4 Alternating Direction Method of
Multipliers (ADMM)
Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) is a power-
ful optimization algorithm to handle large-scale statistical tasks
in diverse application domains. It blends the decomposability of
dual ascent with the great convergence property of the method of
multipliers. Currently, ADMM plays a significant role in solving
statistical problems, such as support vector machines [9], trace
norm regularized least squares minimization [38], and constrained
sparse regression [3]. Except for convex problems, ADMM is also a
widely used solution to some nonconvex problems, whose objective
function could be nonconvex, nonsmooth, or both. [34] shows that
ADMM is able to converge as long as the objective has a smooth
part, while the remaining part can be coupled or nonconvex, or
include separable nonsmooth functions. Applications of ADMM to
nonconvex problems include network reference [25], global con-
formal mapping [17], noisy color image restoration [17].
2.5 Adversarial Defenses
Both learning and security communities have developed many
defensive methods against adversarial examples. Among them, ad-
versarial training and several certified defenses attract the most
attention due to their outstanding/guaranteed performance against
strong attacks [2, 13, 32]. In the following, we briefly introduce
adversarial training and several certified defenses, including the
randomized smoothing method adopted in this paper.
Adversarial Training. Adversarial training is one of the most
successful empirical defenses in the past few years [10, 24, 39]. The
intuition of adversarial training is to improve model robustness by
training the model with adversarial examples. Although adversarial
training achieves tremendous success against many strong attacks
[1, 31, 41], its performance is not theoretically guaranteed and thus
might be compromised in the future. Besides, adversarial training
always requires much more computational resource than standard
training, making it not scalable to complicated models.
Certified Defenses. A defense with a theoretical guarantee on
its defensive performance is considered as a certified defense. In
general, there are threemain approaches to design certified defenses.
The first approach is to formulate the certification problem as an
optimization problem and bound it by dual approach and convex
relaxations [8, 27, 35]. The second approach approximates a convex
set that contains all the possible outputs of each layer to certify
an upper bound on the range of the final output [12, 26, 33]. The
third is the randomized smoothing method used in this paper. The
only essential operation for this method is to add Gaussian/Laplace
noise to the inputs, which is simple and applicable to any deep
learning models. [18] first proves that randomized smoothing is a
certified defense by theories on differential privacy. [19] improves
the certified bound using a lemma on Renyi divergence. Cohen et al.
[7] proves a tight bound on the ℓ2 robust radius certified by adding
Gaussian noise using the Neyman-Pearson lemma. [14] further
extends the approach of [7] to the top − k classification setting.
Since the bound proved by [7] is the tightest, the method in [7] is
used for certification. In this paper we adopt the approach in [18]
due to its ability for efficient inference in practice.
3 THREAT MODEL
3.1 Adversary Knowledge: White-box Setting
In this paper, we follow the white-box setting, where the adver-
sary has full access to the model architecture and parameters. We
make this assumption because (i) it is always a safe, conservative,
and realistic assumption since we might never know the knowl-
edge of potential adversaries about the model [5], which varies
among different adversaries and also changes over time. (ii) For
systems/devices equipped with an action recognition model, recog-
nition is more likely to be done locally, or on a local cloud, making
the adversary easily acquire the model parameters with his own
system/device. Note that although most of the experiments on the
proposed attack and defense are done under the white-box setting,
we also have several experiments on evaluating the transferability
of our attack.
3.2 Adversary Goal: Targeted & Untargeted
label Setting
Under the targeted setting, the goal of an adversary is to mislead
the recognition model to predict the adversarial skeleton action as
a targeted label pre-defined by the adversary. For instance, suppose
the adversary is “kicking" someone under a surveillance camera
equipped with an action recognition model. It may launch a tar-
geted attack to mislead the model to recognize this violent action
as a normal one such as "drinking water". Under the untargeted
label settings, an adversary only aims to disable the recognition and
thus is considered successful as long as the model makes wrong
predictions instead of a specific targeted prediction. In this paper,
we propose two objectives suitable for the above two settings re-
spectively, which will be detailed in section 4.4.
3.3 Imperceptibility & Reproducibility
Except for the aforementioned adversary goals, the adversary also
requires the adversarial perturbation to be both imperceptible and
reproducible. Here “imperceptibility" means it should be difficult
for human vision to figure out the adversarial perturbation, i.e., the
difference between the original and adversarial skeleton actions.
This is not only a common requirement in the previous attacks, but
also a useful one in our scenario. Note that it is natural to schedule
a periodical examination for an autonomous surveillance system
by human labor to check if the system works well. If the system has
been fooled by a seemingly “normal" adversarial skeleton action, the
mistake might be due to the system itself rather than the adversary
who performs the adversarial skeleton action in the examination
process. Here “reproducibility” is an additional requirement specific
to our scenario. As mentioned in the introduction, the adversarial
skeleton action could be a real threat when it can be reproduced under
a real-world system. Thus, tomake our attack a real-world threat, the
generated adversarial skeleton actions should satisfy three concrete
constraints to be reproducible, which will be detailed in section 4.
4 ADVERSARIAL SKELETON ACTION
In this section, we present our proposed attack, i.e., ADMM at-
tack. We first introduce how to formulate the three constraints into
mathematical equations. Then we formulate the constrained opti-
mization problem to generate adversarial skeleton actions under
both targeted and untargeted settings. Finally, we elaborate on how
to solve the optimization problem by ADMM.
4.1 Bone Constraints
We again take the skeletons in the NTU RGB+D dataset as an ex-
ample. As shown in Fig. 2, in a skeleton, there are totally 25 joints,
forming a total of 24 bones. While the bones are not explicitly con-
sidered in modeling, they are strictly connecting to the 25 joints,
thus imposing 24 bone-length constraints, i.e., the distance between
the joints at the two ends of a bone should remain the same in
adversarial skeleton actions. To mathematically represent the 24
bones, we associate each joint with its preceding joint, forming
the two ends of a bone. As a result, the 24 preceding-joints for
joint-2∼joint-25 are denoted as P ≜ {(xτpi ,yτpi , zτpi )25i=2}. The corre-
sponding joint indices of the elements in P are {1, 21, 3, 21, 5, 6, 7,
21, 9, 10, 11, 1, 13, 14, 15, 1, 17, 18, 19, 2, 8, 8, 12, 12}. We define the i-
th bone’s length as Bτi ≜
√
(xτi − xτpi )2 + (yτi − yτpi )2 + (zτi − zτpi )2.
In this regard, the bone constraints can be represented as Lτi = L
′τ
i .
Due to the measurement errors in the NTU dataset itself, here we
also tolerate very small difference between Lτi and L
′τ
i . Therefore,
we can finally formulate the bone constraints as
|B′τi − Bτi |/Bτi ≤ ϵL , (4)
where ϵL is usually set as 0.01 ∼ 0.03. Note that inequality con-
straints in the primal problem will impose inequality constraints on
the corresponding Lagrangian variables in the dual problem. In order
to avoid this in the dual problem, we reformulate the above inequal-
ity constraints as mathematical equations, i.e., (4) is equivalent
to
max{|B′τi − Bτi |/Bτi − ϵL , 0} = 0. (5)
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4.2 Joint Angle Constraints
Except for the bone-length constraints, we also need to impose
constraints on the rotations of the joint angles according to the
physiological structures of human beings. Let us also use the NTU
dataset as an example. Each joint angle corresponds to the angle
between two bones, and thus can be represented by the three joint
locations of those two corresponding bones as illustrated in the
right of Fig. 2. Note that a natural way to compute the joint angle as
shown in Fig. 2 is to first compute the cosine value and then input
the value into the arccos function. However, the gradient of arccos
function is likely exploded, causing large numerical errors when
the cos value of the joint angle is close to 1 ( ddx arccosx = − 1√1−x 2 ).
To deal with this issue, we derive an approximate upper bound
for the changes of joint angle value to avoid computing the ar-
ccos function and its gradient. Again, take the right of Fig. 2 as
an example, the angle change ∆θ9 caused by the displacement of
joint-9 (i.e., x ′τ9 − xτ9 , y′τ9 − yτ9 , z′τ9 − zτ9 ) can be approximated
by sin∆θ9 ≈
√(x ′τ9 −xτ9 )2+(y′τ9 −yτ9 )2+(z′τ9 −zτ9 )2√(xτ10−xτ9 )2+(yτ10−yτ9 )2+(zτ10−zτ9 )2
. In particular, when
the angle change ∆θ is smaller than 0.1 (i.e., 5.73◦), we can con-
sider sin∆θ almost same as ∆θ . The total angle change ∆θ is up-
per bounded by the sum of the changes caused by the displace-
ments caused by joint-9, joint-10, and joint-11. Therefore the upper
bound can be represented by Jτ =
√(x ′τ9 −xτ9 )2+(y′τ9 −yτ9 )2+(z′τ9 −zτ9 )2√(xτ10−xτ9 )2+(yτ10−yτ9 )2+(zτ10−zτ9 )2
+
√(x ′τ10−xτ10)2+(y′τ10−yτ10)2+(z′τ10−zτ10)2√(xτ10−xτ9 )2+(yτ10−yτ9 )2+(zτ10−zτ9 )2
+
√(x ′τ10−xτ10)2+(y′τ10−yτ10)2+(z′τ10−zτ10)2√(xτ11−xτ10)2+(yτ11−yτ10)2+(zτ11−zτ10)2
+
√(x ′τ11−xτ11)2+(y′τ11−yτ11)2+(z′τ11−zτ11)2√(xτ11−xτ10)2+(yτ11−yτ10)2+(zτ11−zτ10)2
Although this representation looks
more complicated than the arccos function, its gradient can be com-
puted efficiently and accurately. Given such an approximation, the
joint angle constraints can be similarly represented as
max{Jτk − ϵ J , 0} = 0 (6)
where ϵ J is set as 0.1 ∼ 0.2 (6◦ ∼ 12◦).
4.3 Speed Constraints
According to the physical conditions of human beings, we should
consider one more type of constraints, i.e., temporal smoothness
constraints. By those constraints, we attempt to restrict the speeds
of the motions in the generated adversarial skeleton actions. Specif-
ically, the speeds of the motions can be approximated by the dis-
placements between two consecutive temporal frames, i.e., Sτm ≈√
(xτ+1m − xτm )2 + (yτ+1m − yτm )2 + (zτ+1m − zτm )2. Then, similar to Eq. 5,
we bound the change of speeds by
max{|S ′τm − Sτm |/Sτm − ϵS , 0} = 0, (7)
where ϵL is usually set as (smaller than) 10%.
4.4 Constrained Primal Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we introduce the main objectives used under the
untargeted setting and targeted setting.
Untargeted Setting. Under the untargeted setting, the adversary
achieves its goal as long as the DNN makes a prediction other than
the ground-truth label, i.e., argmaxk FΘ,k (x′) , l . This will hold
Figure 3: Evolution of the averaged loss items and the con-
straints (β = 1.0)
iff FΘ,l (x′) < maxk,k,l FΘ,k (x′). Therefore, we define the objec-
tive as minimizing max{FΘ,l (x′) −maxk,k,l FΘ,k (x′) + conf , 0},
where conf > 0 is the desired confidence value of the DNN on the
wrong prediction. Note that if the objective is equal to 0, we have
maxk,k,l FΘ,k (x′) ≥ FΘ,l (x′) + conf .
Targeted Setting. The goal of the adversary is to render the predic-
tion result to be the attack target lt , i.e., argmaxk ∈K FΘ,k (x′) = lt .
Therefore, the primal objective is defined as minimizing the cross
entropy between FΘ,k (x′) and lt , or max{maxk,k,lt FΘ,k (x′) −
FΘ,lt (x′) + conf , 0} following the logic of the untargeted setting.
We can also adopt other objectives for our purpose. However, it
turns out the above two main objectives are the most commonly-
used ones in previous work [5, 16, 24]. For simplicity, we denote
the main loss by L(x, l). The constrained primal problem can then
be formulated as
min
x′
L(x′, l) (8)
subject to Eq. (5), (6), (7)
4.5 Dual Optimization by ADMM
Note that our constrained primal problems are in general intractable.
Instead of searching for a solution to the constrained primal prob-
lem, we propose to formulate and optimize its unconstrained dual
problem via ADMM. The algorithm is illustrated in Alg. 1. Specifi-
cally, we first define the augmented Lagrangian of the constrained
primal as shown in Alg. 1. The additional term β2 (∥B′∥2 + ∥J′∥2 +
∥S′∥2), which is commonly used in ADMM (for nonconvex prob-
lems), aims to further penalize any violation of the equality con-
straints. We note that larger β usually leads to smaller violation but
larger final main objective (decreases the attack success rate).
Specifically, given the Lagrangian G(x, l ;λ,ν ,ω) (defined in
Alg. 1), the dual problem is max
λ,ν,ω
min
x′
G(x, l ;λ,ν ,ω). Note that
since the internal function min
x′
G(x, l ;λ,ν ,ω) is an affine function
w.r.t. the variables λ,ν ,ω, we can simply use single-step gradient
ascent with a large step size (usually set as β in ADMM) to up-
date those dual variables. However, G(x, l ;λ,ν ,ω) is an extremely
complicated nonconvex function w.r.t. the adversarial sample x′.
Therefore, in most cases, we could only guarantee local optima
for the internal minimization problem. Fortunately, it turns out
that even the local optima can always fool the DNNs. To find a
local optimum efficiently, we adopt the Adam optimizer instead
of the vanilla stochastic gradient descent (SGD) since Adam opti-
mizer always converges faster than vanilla SGD. Theoretically, a
local minimum is guaranteed because the Adam optimizer stops
updating the variables when the gradients are (close to) 0. Next,
we further look into the evolution of the loss during the optimiza-
tion process. As shown in Fig. 3, at the very beginning (i.e., the
first stage), the internal minimization problem finds adversarial
samples with large violation of the constraints. The large violation
will cause the Lagrangian multipliers λ,ν ,ω to increase rapidly,
and thus significantly increase the loss terms ⟨λ,B′⟩ (bone loss),
⟨ν , J′⟩ (joint loss), and ⟨ω, S′⟩ (speed loss). As a result, the algo-
rithm proceeds into the second stage, where the Adam optimizer
focuses more on diminishing the constraint violation B′, J′, and S′
when optimizing x′. Finally, the algorithm proceeds into a relatively
stable stage where we can stop the algorithm. According to Fig. 2,
our algorithm is very efficient in the sense that it only needs 200
(internal) iterations to enter the final stable stage.
Algorithm 1 Generating Adversarial Skeleton Actions
Require: Loss function L(x, l), hyper-parameter β , adam opti-
mizer for the adversarial skeleton action x′, maximum number
of iterations T .
Define Constraints: Bτj ≜ max{|B′τj − Bτj |/Bτj − ϵL , 0}, Jτk ≜
max{J ′τk −ϵ J , 0}, andS′τm ≜ max{|S ′τm −Sτm |/Sτm −ϵS , 0}. (Vector
Representations: B′, J′, and S′)
Define Lagrangian Variables: λ, ν , andω (Corresponding to
B′, J′, and S′)
Define Augmented Lagrangian: G(x, l ;λ,ν ,ω) ≜ L(x, l) +
⟨λ,B′⟩ + ⟨ν , J′⟩ + ⟨ω, S′⟩ + β2 (∥B′∥2 + ∥J′∥2 + ∥S′∥2).
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
Update x′: fix the multipliers λ(t),ν (t),ω(t)
x′(t + 1) ∈ argminx′ G(x′, l ;λ(t),ν (t),ω(t)) updated by the
adam optimizer
UpdateMultipliers: compute B′(t +1), J′(t +1), and S′ based
on x′
λ(t + 1) = λ(t) + βB′(t + 1); ν (t + 1) = ν (t) + βJ′(t + 1);
ω(t + 1) = ω(t) + βS′(t + 1)
end for
Output x′(T )
5 DEFENSE AGAINST ADVERSARIAL
SKELETON ACTIONS
Note that although the method proposed in [7, 19] can certify larger
robust radii than [18]. However, the sample complexity to compute
the confidence intervals in [7, 19] will lead to computational over-
head in the inference stage. Therefore, we only use the method in
[7] in the certification process. In the inference stage, we modify the
method in [18] to build a relatively efficient defense against adver-
sarial skeleton actions, as shown in Alg. 2. In general, our proposed
defense consists of two steps: adding Gaussian noise and temporal
filtering by Gaussian kernel. In the following, we will detail these
two steps and explain why we include them in the defense.
5.1 Additive Gaussian Noise
Our first step is adding Gaussian noise to the skeleton actions.
In the inference stage, we follow [18] to make the prediction as
argmaxk E(FΘ,k (M(x′))) given input x′, whereM(x) = G(x+ z) is
randomized mechanism with Gaussian noise z and post-processing
function G. In order to estimate E(FΘ (M(x′))), we sample N noisy
samples x˜′(n) = x′ +z˜(n) from N(x′,σ 2 I) and feed them into the
post-processing functionG and the neural network F.E(FΘ (M(x′)))
is estimated by 1N
∑N
n=1 FΘ(G(x˜′(n))), and according to the Cher-
noff bound [4], the error of this estimation is bounded by
Pr (| 1
N
N∑
n=1
FΘ,l (G(x˜′(n))) − E(FΘ,l (M(x′)))| < ϵ) ∼ O(e−Nt
2 )
.
In the certification stage, we rely on the main theorem from [7],
which gives the currently tightest bound:
Lemma 1. Denote an mechanism randomized by Gaussian noise
byM(x) = G(x+ z), and the ground-truth label by l . Define f (x) =
argmaxk FΘ,k (M(x)). Suppose pA & pB satisfy
Pr (f (x) = l) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ max
i,l
Pr (f (x) = i), (9)
the ℓ2 robust radius is R = σ2 (Φ−1(pA) − Φ−1(pB )).
Lemma 1 indicates that as long as ∥ x′ − x ∥2 < R, argmaxi Pr (f (x) =
i) = l , i.e., the prediction is correct. The algorithm using the above
lemma for certification is detailed in Algorithm 3. In the next subsec-
tion, we will detail the post-processing function mentioned before.
Algorithm 2 Defense (Inference)
Require: Neural Network FΘ (·), standard deviation of the addi-
tive Gaussian noise σ , skeleton action x′ (probably adversarial),
number of noisy samples for inference of n.
Sample N samples from N(x′,σ 2 I) → {x˜′(n)|n = 1, 2, ...,N }
Smooth x˜′(n) by a 1 × 5 or 1 × 7 Gaussian filter→ G(x˜′(n))
Feed G(x˜′(n)) into the network→ FΘ(G(x˜′(n)))
Output argmaxl
∑N
n=1 FΘ,l (G(x˜′(n)))
5.2 Temporal Filtering by Gaussian Kernel
After adding Gaussian noise to the skeleton actions, we propose to
further smooths the action along the temporal axis by a 1×5 or 1×7
Gaussian filter. The intuition is that the adjacent frames in a skeleton
action sequence are very similar to each other, and thus can be used
as references to rectify the adversarial perturbations. Although this
additional operation does not improve the certification results, we
observe that it can help our defense become more compatible with
a normally trained model than the original randomized smoothing
method in [7, 18]. Also, we argue that this simple operation is not
usually used in previous work because it is not very suitable in the
image recognition domain, where no adjacency information (along
the temporal axis) is available.
6 EXPERIMENTS
6.1 Attack Performance
Main Results. The main results of our attack are shown in Ta-
ble 5. As we can see, our proposed attack can achieve 100% success
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Figure 4: The top six frames represent a “kicking (another person)" skeleton action, and the bottom six frames are the corre-
sponding frames from the adversarial skeleton action generated by our attack under the targeted setting (optimizing the first
person). The generated adversarial skeleton action is recognized as “drinking water" by the 2s-AGCN.
White-box
β
NTU CV NTU CS
Untargeted Success Rate ∆B/B ∆J ∆K/K ℓ2 Success Rate ∆L/L ∆J ∆K/K ℓ2
HCN
0.1 100% 2.64% 0.132 4.52% 0.396 100% 2.17% 0.111 3.17% 0.347
1.0 100% 1.92% 0.099 1.65% 0.330 100% 1.62% 0.086 1.30% 0.290
10.0 92.8% 1.50% 0.085 1.25% 0.270 92.4% 1.25% 0.073 0.98% 0.241
2s-AGCN
0.1 100% 2.17% 0.112 1.62% 0.653 100% 1.97% 0.107 2.20% 0.614
1.0 100% 1.70% 0.094 0.59% 0.528 100% 1.46% 0.086 0.57% 0.496
10.0 99.0% 1.37% 0.083 0.39% 0.428 98.8% 1.19% 0.078 0.34% 0.413
White-box
β
NTU CV NTU CS
targeted Success Rate ∆B/B ∆J ∆K/K ℓ2 Success Rate ∆L/L ∆J ∆K/K ℓ2
HCN
0.1 100% 3.60% 0.165 7.75% 0.673 100% 3.55% 0.165 6.68% 0.723
1.0 99.7% 3.24% 0.156 4.69% 0.630 100% 3.16% 0.155 4.24% 0.674
10.0 22.3% 2.27% 0.115 2.83% 0.444 26.9% 2.14% 0.112 2.50% 0.462
2s-AGCN
0.1 100% 1.66% 0.090 0.55% 0.569 100% 1.67% 0.091 0.71% 0.649
1.0 100% 1.61% 0.091 0.42% 0.556 100% 1.56% 0.090 0.49% 0.615
10.0 97.2% 1.54% 0.089 0.38% 0.512 97.9% 1.47% 0.087 0.40% 0.552
Table 1: The empiricalperformance of our proposedmethod: averaged bone-length difference between original and adversarial
skeletons (∆L/L), averaged joint angle difference (upper bound) (∆J/J ), kinetic energy difference (∆K/K), ℓ2 distance (ℓ2).
Algorithm 3 Defense (Certification)
Require: Neural Network FΘ (·), standard deviation of the additive
Gaussian noise σ , original and adversarial skeleton action x &
x′, number of noisy samples for inference of n, a predefined
confidence value p for hypothesis test (usually 95%).
Recognition: Sample N samples from N(x,σ 2 I) → {x˜(n)|n =
1, 2, ...,N }
Smooth x˜(n) by a 1 × 5 or 1 × 7 Gaussian filter→ G(x˜(n))
Feed x˜(n) into the (normally trained) network→ FΘ(G(x˜(n)))
Confidence Interval: Compute the number (counts) top two
indices in {argmaxk FΘ,k (G(x˜(n))) | n = 1, 2, ...,N } → cA, cB
Compute the lower bound for pA and the upper bound for pB by
the method in [11] with confidence p → pA,pB .
Certification: Compute the certified ℓ2 radius by R =
σ
2 (Φ−1(pA) − Φ−1(pB )).
Output max{R, 0} if pA corresponds to the ground-truth label l
else −1
Compare R with ∥ x′ − x ∥2, and if R is larger, then output the
index corresponding to cA.
rates with very small violation of the constraints. The averaged
normalized bone-length difference is approximately 1% ∼ 2%, and
the violation of the joint angles is smaller than 10◦. Considering the
skeleton data is usually noisy, this subtle violation is considered “very
common" in real world. We also provide more experimental results
in the supplementary material (e.g., on Kinetics).
We also note that adversarial-sample generation under the untar-
geted setting is usually easier than that under the targeted setting
since a targeted adversarial sample is guaranteed to be an untar-
geted adversarial sample, but not vice versa. This fact is also re-
flected by the results in Table 5. Furthermore, in Figure 4, we show
the visualization result of an adversarial skeleton action (recognized
as a normal action “drinking water") generated by our attack, which
is almost visually indistinguishable from its original skeleton action
(“kicking"). Figures of more adversarial actions are attached in the
appendix.
Transferability. In order to shed light on the transferability of our
attack, we feed the adversarial skeleton actions generated on a HCN
model to another HCN model and 2s-AGCN, respectively. In order
to boost the transferability performance, we set β as 0.01 or 0.1 to
generate adversarial skeleton actions with larger perturbation. The
attack success rates are given in Table 2. Similar to 3D adversarial
Source (Model)→ Target Dataset β = 0.1 β = 0.01
HCN(1)→ HCN(2) NTU CV 24.7% 26.0%NTU CS 28.5% 32.6%
HCN(1)→ 2s-AGCN NTU CV 17.6% 20.4%NTU CS 17.3% 19.6%
Table 2: Attack success rates of adversarial examples trans-
ferred between models.
Untargeted Success Rate ∆B/B ∆J ∆K/K ℓ2
NTU CV 100% 4.67% 0.241 13.0% 0.278
NTU CS 100% 4.09% 0.211 10.2% 0.244
Targeted Success Rate ∆B/B ∆J ∆K/K ℓ2
NTU CV 100% 8.82% 0.468 38.1% 0.510
NTU CS 100% 9.45% 0.507 36.8% 0.520
Table 3: Adversarial skeleton actions generated by C&W at-
tack on HCN (ℓ2 distance is smaller).
Model Setting NTU CV NTU CS
σ = 0.01 σ = 0.02 σ = 0.01 σ = 0.02
HCN Untargeted 62.0% 62.3% 50.6% 51.4%Targeted 79.4% 70.8% 67.1% 58.3%
2s-AGCN Untargeted 51.0% 42.2% 42.1% 40.2%Targeted 60.8% 50.5% 42.2% 44.1%
Table 4: Empirical performance (model accuracy) of our pro-
posed defense on normally trained model.
point clouds [36], the transferability of the adversarial skeleton actions
is also a little limited compared with adversarial images.
Comparison with C&W Attack. We use C&W attack as an ex-
ample to shed light on the difference between our attack and the
existing attacks. C&W attack has been demonstrated as a successful
optimization-based adversarial attack in many application domains.
However, since C&W attack mainly considers minimizing the ℓ2
distance between original and adversarial skeletons, it might easily
violate the constraints, as shown in our simple case study (Table 3).
6.2 Defense Performance
Empirical Results. We demonstrate the performance of the de-
fense for inference in Table 4. We set β = 1.0 to generate adversarial
examples, and set N = 50 (Alg. 2), which is more smaller than the
number of samples required for certification but can achieve good
empirical performance, as shown in Table 4. it is much easier to
defend adversarial skeleton actions under the targeted setting than
the untargeted setting. Note that the accuracy of HCN on NTU-CV
and NTU-CS is respectively 91.1% and 86.5% [20], and the accuracy
of 2s-AGCN is respectively 95.1% and 88.5% [29].
Certified Results. Due to the high computational cost of the cer-
tification method (N=1000), we mainly evaluate the certification
algorithm on HCN. The certified accuracy achieved by different
levels of noise is shown in Fig. 5. Note that we use the same level
of noise to train the model as the noise for certification. As we can
Figure 5: Certification accuracy on HCN
see, with sacrificing 10% ∼ 20% accuracy on the clean samples, the
method is able to achieve about 50% certified accuracy (ℓ2 = 0.5).
7 CONCLUSION
We study the problem of adversarial vulnerability of skeleton-based
action recognition. We first identify and formulate three main con-
straints that should be considered in adversarial skeleton actions.
Since the corresponding constrained optimization problem is in-
tractable, we propose to optimize its dual problem by ADMM,which
is a generic method first proposed in this paper to generate con-
strained adversarial examples. To defend against adversarial skele-
ton actions, we further specify an efficient defensive inference
algorithm and a certification algorithm. The effectiveness of the
attack and defense is demonstrated on two opensource models, and
the results induce several interesting observations that can help us
understand more about adversarial skeleton actions.
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A APPENDIX
Additional visualization results. Here we provide more visualiza-
tion results. We use “drinking water" as the attack target because
“drinking water" is a normal action, which looks completely differ-
ent from the some violent/abnormal actions like throwing, kicking,
pushing, and punching. Despite the obvious visual difference be-
tween “drinking water" and those abnormal actions, our attack
can still fool the state-of-the-art models to recognize those abnor-
mal actions as “drinking water" by imperceptible and reproducible
perturbation, which indicates that our attack is very powerful. In
Fig. 6, we show that our attack can fool the HCN model to recog-
nize the “throwing", “pushing", and “kicking" actions as a normal
action “drinking water" by imperceptible adversarial perturbation.
Similarly, in Fig. 7, we show that our attack can fool the 2s-AGCN
model to recognize the “throwing" and “pushing" actions as a nor-
mal action “drinking water". These visualization results along with
the quantitative results in Table 1 (in the paper) demonstrate that
the perturbations are indeed imperceptible and reproducible.
Kinetics Dataset. Except for the NTU dataset, we also evaluate
our attack on another popular dataset, i.e., Kinetics-400 dataset un-
der both the untargeted and targeted settings. As shown in Table 5,
under the untargeted setting, our attack can achieve 100% attack
success rates with very small violation of the constraints, similar to
its performance on the NTU dataset. However, under the targeted
setting, it is much more difficult for our attack to find targeted
adversarial skeleton actions with very small violation of the con-
straints. This is because Kinetics-400 has 400 classes of actions, and
the original NTU dataset only has 60 classes of actions. Also, we
argue that the results on Kinetics under the targeted setting do not
devalue our attack since even for most of the clean testing samples
from Kinetics, it is difficult for the state-of-the-models to predict
their ground-truth labels (targets).
Figure 6: The adversarial skeleton actions generated by our attack under the targeted setting. The generated adversarial skele-
ton actions are recognized as “drinking water" by the HCN.
Figure 7: The adversarial skeleton actions generated by our attack under the targeted setting. The generated adversarial skele-
ton action is recognized as “drinking water" by the 2s-AGCN.
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Untargeted β Kinetics-400Success Rate ∆B/B ∆J ∆K/K ℓ2
HCN
0.1 100% 2.60% 0.082 1.66% 0.150
1.0 100% 2.58% 0.080 1.52% 0.162
10.0 98.8% 2.49% 0.078 1.21% 0.145
2s-AGCN
0.1 100% 0.91% 0.053 0.58% 0.331
1.0 100% 0.77% 0.047 0.53% 0.298
10.0 100% 0.75% 0.046 0.52% 0.287
Targeted β Kinetics-400Success Rate ∆B/B ∆J ∆K/K ℓ2
HCN
0.1 90.2% 5.22% 0.220 11.2% 1.864
1.0 67.2% 2.79% 0.124 4.86% 1.350
10.0 17.2% 1.44% 0.073 2.36% 0.763
2s-AGCN
0.1 99.2% 5.25% 0.167 1.20% 0.725
1.0 98.8% 5.04% 0.159 1.21% 0.722
10.0 98.4% 4.89% 0.153 1.03% 0.677
Table 5: The performance of our proposed attack on Kinet-
ics: success rate, averaged bone-length difference between
original and adversarial skeletons (∆L/L), averaged joint an-
gle difference (upper bound) (∆J/J ), kinetic energy differ-
ence (∆K/K), ℓ2 distance (ℓ2).
